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An explanation is given why communist economies usually react
smoothly but sometimes very dramatically to seemingly minor
changes in the political and economic environment. In this paper
such dramatic reactions materialize in a sudden clamp-down on in-
dividual freedom and sudden economic prosperity or in quick po-
litical liberalization and a quick demise of economic success.
Furthermore, the consequences of temporary economic aid in the
face of these potential crises are analysed.
1. Introduction
Communist countries sometimes are shattered by fierce crises
in which economic success or individual freedom enjoyed by citi-
zens changes dramatically within a very short length of time. The
demise of the Prague Spring, Tiananmen Square 1989, or
Perestroika in the U.S.S.R. are, perhaps, points in case. These
crises erupted seemingly without equally dramatic changes in the
political or economic conditions under which these countries
operate. Furthermore, there is historical evidence that different
communist countries operating under rather similar conditions can
feature significant differences in terms of both individual
freedom and economic success. In one country citizens live in
relative prosperity but are deprived of individual freedom. In
another country citizens enjoy freedom but suffer from relative
poverty. Czechoslovakia and Poland in the early and mid 1980"s
may serve as an example.
This paper presents a simple model of a communist society in
which a ruling oligarchy always maximizes its utility. This is
done by a suitable choice from the set of feasible overall econo-
mic success and feasible individual freedom citizens enjoy. This
model features some of the forementioned phenomena. A crisis is
interpreted as a catastophe (in the sense of THOM [1976]) in
which local maxima for the oligarchy suddenly disappear due to
marginal changes in political or economic parameters. Further-- 2 -
more, different communist societies may be in markedly different
equilibria under identical conditions.
2. The Model
Perhaps the most basic difference between a market economy and
a command and control economy is the incentive effect of indivi-
dual freedom. Under the incentives set by a market economy there
exists a positive relation between individual freedom to act ego-
istically and the overall economic success of a country. This is
depicted in Diagram 1 by a movement from E to G, where Y denotes
national output and F individual freedom of citizens.
Communist economies are different. This paper entertains the
view that increasing individual freedom within a command and con-
trol economy, i.e. under the preservation of the communist incen-
tive system, is like throwing sand into the wheels of the econo-
my. Negligence or sabotage increases and citizens engage in rent-
seeking rather than in entrepreneurial or otherwise productive
activities. This is depicted in Diagram 1 by the declining func-
tion of the form Y = r-b»F. Under complete control of indivi-
duals, national output is given by the resource endowment r. If
individual freedom increases output declines. This trade-off be-
tween economic success and individual freedom of citizens poses a
restriction for the ruling oligarchy.
The parameter b in this restriction may be interpreted as an
index of the work morale of citizens or more generally of their
affinity for the communist economic system. If b increases this
affinity declines. As a consequence negligence and rent-seeking
increase for any given level of individual freedom. This decrea-
ses national output for a given level of freedom as is indicated
by the clockwise turn of this restriction around r.
Conceivably, there is a positive trade-off for small levels of
individual freedom. This, however, is not a critical assump-
tion. What matters for the results obtained is the assumption
that for large enough levels of individual freedom the trade-
off is negative.- 3 -
The ordinal system of indifference curves I -l_ represents the
preferences of both citizens and the oligarchy. This harmony of
interests is at variance with viewing the activities of the oli-
garchy as theft at the costs of citizens (GROSSMAN and NOH 1988],
SCHUKNECHT [1990]). It is not denied here that the oligarchy may
engage in theft. Rather it is presumed that the size of the oli-
garchy is small relative to the size of the population so that
2
the consequences of theft are not felt by citizens. Then, uti-
lity of the oligarchy is positively related to utility of- citi-
zens if the luxury or the activities of the oligarchy is less
likely to catch the jealous interest of citizens the more well
off the latter are.
Utility of citizens increase in both national output and indi-
vidual freedom. This is represented by the system of indifference
curves I--I- where utility improves from movements such as that
from E to G.
Indifference curves of citizens feature a patological region
in an area where utility is low but where the deprivation from
either commodities or freedom or both is not extreme. In this
region of "mild" deprivation indifference curves are concave. Un-
der "mild" deprivation people are assumed to become politically
apathetic and turn to their personal affairs. The oligarchy can
exploit this as it needs to compensate citizens for successive
decreases in national output only with increases in freedom at
decreasing rates in order to stay equally well off. If depriva-
tion of either commodities or freedom or both becomes extreme,
citizens turn radical and compensation must take place at in-
creasing rates. Similarly, at sufficiently high utility levels
The insignificance of theft relates only to activities within
a communist system. Preserving the system by preventing the
conversion into a market economy, to take advantage of a mo-
tion in the direction from E to G, may, however, be viewed as
a significant theft indeed.
"Unconventional" behavior of humans in situations of relative
deprivation is frequently observed. For a psychological inter-
pretation of some of these phenomena see e.g. SCITOVSKY
[1976] .- 4 -
the deprivation effect vanishes. The model is completed by as-
4
suming that the oligarchy is a local utility maximizer.
3. The Occurrence of Crises
Depending on the values of the parameters r and b there exist
unique equilibria outside the pathological area, for example in
D, and multiple equilibria if the restriction intersects the
pathological area. Given the restriction depicted in Diagram 1
there exist two maxima in A and C and a minimum in B.
Diagram 1
This assumption can be motivated by the idea that the oli-
garchy has a distaste for major changes and thus tries to
avoid a jump from a local to a global maximum whenever possi-
ble.- 5 -
Multiple maxima can be classified according to their relative
abundance of individual freedom F. If the work-morale index b de-
creases sufficiently then the maxima of class C vanishes. In this
situation, if the oligarchy has been at an optimum of class C it
cannot attain optimality anymore by marginal adaptations. It has
to switch to the maximum of class A. This is a crisis. There is
rapid liberalization and a rapid demise of economic success.
On the contrary, if b increases sufficiently then the maximum
of class A vanishes. An oligarchy being in a class A equilibrium
has to switch to one of class C. The crisis materializes in a
crackdown on citizens' freedom and sudden economic success.
For further analysis note that the maximizing behavior of the
oligarchy for any given constraint can be sufficiently characte-
rised by an equilibrium value of freedom, F , as Y and F are
uniquely related. The three-dimensional graph, relating
equlibrium values of F to values of r and b is equivalent to the
graph of the cusp catastrophe (see e.g. WOODCOCK and DAVIS
[1978]). This graph is illustrated in Diagram 2.
For low or high values of b there is a unique F such as in H'
and K'. For moderate values of r and b, representing the region
of mild deprivation in Diagram 1, there are two maxima. For
example, for parameter values given by T" in the b-r plane A'
corresponds to a maximum of class A whereas C" corresponds to a
maximum of class C. The shaded area is inadmissible as it repre-
sents utility minima for the oligarchy.
Hold the resource endowment of the country fixed at r, say.
Then a continuous decrease in b corresponds to a motion from K' ,
say, to L'. This motion represents a gradual liberalization as a
reaction to citizens' growing affinity to the system. A further
decrease in b triggers a jump from L' to M' associated with rapid
political liberalization and a collapse of national output.
There exists hysteresis. A small decline in work-morale at M'
does not trigger a large scale reversal of large scale liberali-
zation as the local utility maximizing oligarchy moves in the di-
rection of A' . After a crisis "nothing is as it used to be be-




If citizens' affinity to the economic system further declines
there is a crackdown on individual freedom at N' , where type A
equlibria vanish and the oligarchy switches to P'. At the same
time national output is booming. Again, the crisis has led to
fundamental changes as a reversal of the trend moves the equili-
brium in the direction of C instead of moving it back to the
liberal tier to N'.
4. The Consequences of Temporary Aid
Projecting the cusp in Diagram 2 into the b-r plane we obtain
the bifurcation set represented by the triangle Q"-S"-R" in Dia-
gram 3.- 7 -
Diagram 3
For example, a movement from K" to H" in Diagram 3 on the path
a1 and a_ corresponds to a movement from K' to H' in Diagram 2,
where the crisis, occuring at L', is represented by the transi-
tion from within to outside the bifurcation set.
Temporary economic aid can be modelled as a temporary increase
in the reserve endowment of the country, r. Temporary economic
aid to a communist country can have important and quite surpris-
ing effects.
For example, if a gradual reduction from b., to b_ is accompa-
nied by temporary aid, then the path of transition a., is replaced
by a,. Although under both trajectories the conditions under
which the oligarchy operates are ultimately given by T", the
long-run" equilibrium differs. Without aid the long-run equili-- 8 -
brium is the "repressive" equilibrium C whereas under temporary
aid A' on the liberal upper tier in Diagram 2 is attained.
Thus communist countries operating under very similar condi-
tions can differ substantially in terms of economic success and
individual freedom.
However, aid can have the opposite effect. For example, if a
rise of b from b.. to b. is accompanied by temporary aid the tra-
jectory a- guids the oligarchy into a "repressive" equilibrium of
class C, whereas a liberal equilibrium of class A would have been
obtained had the country been left unaided.
Temporary economic aid need not necessarily have a lasting
effect. For example, starting from b~, if b.. represents citizens'
long-run affinity to the economic system then trajectory a. guids
the oligarchy into the same equilibrium as trajectory a., and a~.
However, temporary aid allows the oligarchy to sail clear of the
cliffs of the cusp. The economic crisis associated with a jump
from L' to M' is avoided.
These results seem to suggest that one ought to be very wary
when considering economic aid for a communist country when it is
in a state of transition. If reforms stay short of an abolition
of the communist economic system then aid can have quite uninten-
ded effects indeed.Bibliofhek
des Institute fur Weltwirtscbaft
- 9 -
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